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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 
INWARD INVESTMENT AND SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION: TOWARDS A BALANCED VIEW 
by Professor Neil Hood, Department of Marketing, University of Strathclyde1 
Introduction 
Over the recent past there has been much debate 
about the likely impact of the Labour party's 
proposals to legislate for the establishment of a 
Scottish parliament to handle the internal affairs of 
the country (Labour Party, 1995). These plans have 
been subject to scrutiny from many quarters, not 
least from the business and financial community, 
with particular interest being shown in the potential 
fiscal implications. The inclination of much of the 
more vocal Scottish business comment has 
understandably been cautious about regional 
devolution as a concept within an integrating 
European market, implicitly rejecting the supposed 
benefits of a "Europe of the Regions'. Within such 
comment, frequent reference has been made to the 
potentially negative effects on inward investment 
into Scotland, without too much evaluation as to the 
reasoning behind such conclusions. 
This paper analyses the various issues relating to 
inward investment in Scotland upon which 
devolution, as currently proposed, might exert some 
influence. It does not speculate on whether 
independence for Scotland would follow or what 
impact that might have. Within all the potential 
business effects, the coverage here is confined to 
inward investment in view of its scale, mobility, 
international orientation, the role it plays within the 
Scottish economy and the choices which such 
companies can exercise on locations. Within that 
group of companies, the focus is mainly on 
manufacturing investment. It is written from a 
neutral political perspective and concentrates on 
bringing a balanced judgement to the whole 
question based on many years of both academic 
research and practical experience in this field. Its 
conclusions cannot be regarded as definitive; at best 
they could, however, be regarded as reasonably 
well-informed. It is recognised that there are many 
aspects of the potential impact of devolution on 
corporate competitive positions and on their 
decision processes which are extremely difficult to 
forecast at this stage. All comments made on the 
issue should be made with a health warning, 
including those offered in this paper. 
This being the case, attention is directed to four 
areas. The first section contains a brief review of 
the proposals, in as much as they raise uncertainties 
for inward investors. Secondly, attention is drawn 
to the relevant characteristics of foreign direct 
investment (fdi) in Scotland, related to which 
devolution might be of particular significance. It is 
evident that international companies of most types 
display certain behavioural patterns which are 
material to interpreting the possible effects of 
devolution on both existing fdi stocks in, and flows 
into, Scotland and some of these are covered in the 
third section. Fourthly, it is necessary to review the 
highlights of the likely EU environment for fdi 
attraction in the second half of the 1990s, in order 
to consider how the environment in a devolved 
Scodand might compare with it. Finally, and in the 
light of the interpretations contained in these three 
sections, me concluding part of the paper provides 
a speculative overview of the probable 
consequences of devolution on inward investment 
attraction and development in Scodand. Thereafter 
Appendix 1 gives an overview of the responses to 
this analysis when the earlier version was published. 
Devolution and Uncertainty 
Most business decisions are taken without perfect 
knowledge of their context or their consequences. 
Hence, it could be argued that the existence of 
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some measure of uncertainty regarding the effects 
of devolution in Scotland is not in itself an issue. 
The more central questions may therefore be - how 
much uncertainty?; and concerning which areas of 
business activity? To answer these, several 
characteristics of the devolution proposals have to 
be borne in mind. The published intention is that 
the Scottish parliament's room for manoeuvre would 
be tightly constrained. It would be assigned all 
income tax and VAT receipts raised in Scotland, 
although these revenues together with local 
government taxes meet only some 86% of the 
present Scottish Office budget Under the present 
proposals, there would be a top up arrangement 
with an equalisation grant from the UK 
Government, but the Scottish parliament would also 
have the power to vary the basic rate of income tax 
in Scotland by 3p in the pound - a power "to be 
used only with prudence and caution" (Labour 
Party, 1995, p3). 
It is difficult to convincingly argue that these 
proposals constitute a level of uncertainty for 
international companies operating in Scotland which 
in any way matches the shifts of technological 
advantage, market demand and exchange rate 
volatility already handled by them on an on-going 
basis - assuming that the differential between 
Scotland and its competitors is not changed in their 
favour by other factors. Nor would such fiscal 
flexibilities as were possessed by the proposed 
parliament be likely to materially change the factor 
conditions which initially led these companies to be 
in Scotland. These views have been broadly shared 
by some others looking at this issue from an 
objective perspective in terms of the Scottish 
financial sector (Bain, 1994). 
One of the particularly clear and welcome 
contributions regarding the financial sector (Patullo, 
1994) has recently helped to move the debate to the 
stage where sector specialists have articulated the 
need for the maintenance of the same key 
environmental parameters in the Scottish and UK 
economies post-devolution. In this case the plea, 
particularly in the banking context, was for no 
different or additional taxation of corporate bodies 
in Scotland; the same supervisory disciplines and 
capital requirements as the principal London trading 
banks; and that the Financial Services Act and 
functional self-regulatory bodies should operate on 
both sides of the border. It is critical that well-
argued and detailed contributions of this type 
emerge from business interests in Scotland to 
ensure that those drafting devolution proposals are 
made fully aware of the economic realities of 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
highly competitive markets and the implications 
which UK economic integration has for 
international competitiveness in many sectors. The 
addressing of these issues and appropriate political 
responses can only help to reduce some of the 
uncertainties associated with the present proposals. 
The more critical uncertainty may, however, lie 
deeper than the proposals themselves, in that 
political tensions in the post-devolution UK 
environment might fuel the case for Scottish 
independence. There is a serious question of 
whether a parliament can be financed in a way 
which would not threaten the potential integrity of 
the UK (Bell and Dow, 1995). For example, one 
potential cause of such tensions is deemed to lie in 
the fact that identifiable public expenditure in 
Scotland is reported to be £16 per head higher than 
the rest of the UK. This type of scenario could 
subsequently generate differential levels of taxation 
across the full spectrum of fiscal activity and 
materially change the relative cost base within the 
UK. In effect this line of argument views 
devolution as opening up the prospect of a level of 
risk for business investment in Scotland which 
would not exist elsewhere in the UK unless similar 
powers were also vested in regional assemblies in 
England and Wales. This is, however, a rather 
malevolent scenario, which is arguably founded on 
substantial political discontinuity between Scodand 
and the rest of the UK (Stevens, 1995). A more 
benign interpretation would assume the continuing 
and long-standing commitment to the promotion of 
economic development in Scotland, and even the 
potential introduction of more positive measures to 
stimulate economic growth, thereby enhancing the 
Scottish case for investment attraction and 
development - provided this could be afforded 
without significant changes in the relative tax 
position. 
In summary, while there are undeniable 
uncertainties associated with any constitutional 
change, their effects may well be neutral over the 
short to medium term. The final balance of 
judgement lies in the extent to which devolution in 
Scotland is replicated elsewhere in the UK and in 
the presence or absence of tensions which flow 
from that outcome. Since some 70% of Scotland's 
trade is with England and 70% of Scottish 
employees in industry are employed by companies 
based outside Scodand, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that there would be a high degree of 
responsibility applied to adopting any policy 
measures which would fail to recognise these 
economic realities. Indeed, it could be argued that 
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through the existence of bodies such as SDA/HIDB, 
and more recently the SE/HIE network, over the 
past 20 years Scotland has been a pioneer in many 
aspects of industrial and economic development and 
that such an environment would be highly creative 
in ways of exploiting the new opportunities open to 
i t In short, the jury is still out as to whether the 
uncertainty associated with Scottish devolution 
cannot be readily managed by all parties. 
Relevant Characteristics of Inward Investment in 
Scotland 
In this section attention is drawn to a number of 
features of both the existing stock of inward 
investment in Scotland and the potential flows in 
the immediate future, where the prospect of 
devolution, and some of the uncertainties associated 
with it, might have distinctive effects. The 
conditionality of that sentence is important, since 
some of these outcomes are far from clear. 
Reinvestment Decisions: A counter-
weighing variable lies perhaps in the 
proportion of inward investment projects 
which consist of expansions from within 
the existing stock of companies already in 
Scotland. In recent years this has 
accounted for some 50% of reported 
projects at both Scottish and UK level. 
On the whole, companies reinvesting in 
Scotland have relatively few choices in the 
short term as to where to place that 
investment in order to supply European 
markets from within the EU borders. 
Thus, the conditions immediately post-
devolution would have to be severely 
adverse to deter many projects in this 
category. However, this view has to be 
countered to some degree by the continued 
existence of multi-plant facilities in the 
same product area within many MNEs in 
Europe, even with the advent of the Single 
European Market (SEM). The 
rationalisation induced by these European 
changes has yet to occur in many 
corporations, and it is again possible that 
distinctive and new conditions in the 
Scottish environment could work against 
certain types of reinvestment However, in 
these scenarios, and given continued 
world-class performance in Scottish plants 
within such networks, it is again difficult 
to argue that this would have an inherently 
negative effect on reinvestment patterns. 
Many other sector-specific and plant-
specific factors would have to coincide to 
produce such a negative outcome. 
Sectoral concentration in electronics: In 
the case of this feature, there are perhaps 
three main variables which are particularly 
relevant The first is related to the 
clustering of electronics activity in 
Scotland and the beginnings of an 
integrated base in this sector in terms of 
skills, products and services. While a 
compelling factor for many new MNE 
entrants in the present climate, the Scottish 
electronics environment is by no means 
unique in Europe (Peters, 1995). As a 
result it is difficult to argue that its 
existence would either increase or decrease 
the tolerance of MNEs to the changes 
which devolution would bring. The other 
two variables tend to confirm this. It is 
clear that electronics product cycles have 
been reducing dramatically in recent years 
and as a result the periods over which 
investment is recovered have reduced. The 
diversity of companies in this sector, in 
terms of both capital/labour intensity and 
original equipment/sub-contractor status, 
US as a country of origin: The US 
remains the single most important source 
of manufacturing inward investment into 
Scotland. But not all of these companies 
have international experience when they 
locate. Indeed, probably about one-third 
of the annual cases consist of companies 
making their first overseas manufacturing 
investment in Scodand. Stated another 
way, they are not experienced in arriving 
at a considered view of 'political risk' in 
environments which, though once stable, 
might now become rather less predictable. 
The risk aversion of such companies, and 
of many similar smaller investors from the 
Far East, has been one of the factors 
leading them to choose UK locations 
where many multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) have been established for several 
decades. Bearing in mind that the 
evidence (Netherlands Economic Institute 
and Ernst & Young, 1992) points to new 
inward investors choosing a country first 
and thereafter a region within it, it is just 
possible that negative perceptions being 
promulgated about Scottish devolution 
might lead them to choose other UK 
regions. 
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makes it impossible to thereafter 
say that electronics companies are 
now more footloose than they 
once were. However, it is a 
sector which is characterised by 
global products and global 
sourcing, both of which factors 
make it subject to rapid 
adjustments to changing levels of 
profitability due to technological 
and market conditions. On 
balance therefore, if asked to 
judge whether electronics would 
be a sector within Scotland which 
would be sensit ive to 
environmental uncertainty which 
would be deemed to exert an 
i n f l u e n c e o v e r i t s 
competitiveness, the answer 
would be in the affirmative. 
European export bases: It is well 
established that Scotland (and much of the 
UK) plays an important role as a 
manufacturing base for MNEs exporting 
throughout EU markets. For obvious 
reasons, it has little fdi leverage related to 
market size; although the 'clustering' effect 
of internal markets created between MNE 
subsidiaries in Scotland is significant for 
some parties. As a broad approximation, 
it can then be concluded that where the 
markets are largely external, the consistent 
case for Scotland as an fdi base must lie in 
its continued cost competitiveness and in 
associated skill and efficiency factors. The 
question then is would devolution, as 
proposed, materially alter these favourable 
conditions and thereby diminish the 
strongly positive effect arising from the 
Scottish economy being exposed to large 
scale business opportunities in growth 
markets through this route? Again there is 
nothing in the present proposals to suggest 
that this would be the case. Indeed, there 
is much to be said about the existence of 
inherent checks and balances in policy 
making which might have any potentially 
negative effect in this area, simply because 
many of the MNEs have (or can readily 
acquire) alternative ways of serving EU 
markets. A balanced approach is usually 
taken by politicians where the opportunity 
costs in terms of fiscal revenues and job 
losses are well understood. This is even 
more the case where other parts of the UK 
and Europe would welcome investors were 
they to feel that they were uncomfortable 
in a devolved Scottish context In effect 
therefore there should be a strong 
coincidence of interests between the public 
and private sectors in maintaining the 
'export base' dimension of the Scottish 
economy. 
MNE subsidiaries as a tax base: The 
fiscal aspect of the devolution proposals 
would require a Scottish parliament to 
regard MNE subsidiaries as a critical part 
of their tax base, both in terms of their 
employment and trading. That this is the 
case is not merely related to their scale but 
also to their inherent characteristics as 
measured by productivity, investment 
levels, wage rates and so on (Young, et al, 
1993). Viewed from a fiscal perspective, 
it is a relatively healthy and growth-
oriented part of the tax base which should 
not be lightly tampered with. It is highly 
desirable that the interests of a devolved 
Scottish parliament within the UK are not 
allowed to stray towards corporate taxation 
and that this remains a UK issue. In 
effect, this proposition recognises that all 
MNE networks have tax offset capabilities 
and that they will so order their corporate 
affairs at a regional (European) or global 
level in order to minimise costs and 
maximise competitiveness. It also draws 
a clear distinction between a post-
devolution Scotland as proposed and the 
independent country of Ireland as one of 
its proximate and vigorous inward 
investment competitors. The latter, from 
a particular history of late industrial 
development, has used corporation tax as 
a fiscal incentive in a manner which is 
outwith anything contained in the present 
proposals for Scotland. To try to move in 
the Irish direction from the present UK 
base, and given the stock of fdi in 
Scotland, would not only be highly 
detrimental in terms of the other 
implications for personal and sales 
taxation, but also probably impossible in 
view of the EU perspective on relative 
economic need. Such radical thinking 
would be best discarded by anyone with 
the medium to long-term interests of the 
Scottish economy at the forefront of their 
minds. 
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Relevant Characteristics of FDI in Europe the devolution proposals alone would lead 
Scotland to lose that position. 
Attention is now directed towards the wider context 
within which both inward investment from outwith 
die EU, and intra-EU investment, occurs. Viewed 
from this perspective, the proposed changes 
associated with Scottish devolution are a rather 
minor matter when set against the wide range of 
market opportunities and environments within which 
fdi is demonstrably able to prosper. To illustrate 
this point, three related areas are reviewed within 
this section. 
Integration and responsiveness: It is 
clear that most MNEs show high degrees 
of adaptability when it comes to their 
accommodating of different types of policy 
environment, provided the fundamentals of 
these environments and their market are 
correct and it is in their business interests 
so to do. Among the many relevant 
dimensions which MNEs already adapt to 
in Europe are high social overhead costs; 
high barriers to plant closures and to 
labour shedding; nationalism in purchasing 
policies; two-tier boards; unstable political 
regimes; inadequate infrastructure; frequent 
changes of government, and so on. 
Meanwhile, many mature MNEs have 
recalibrated their tolerance for risk within 
Europe in their early investments in former 
Comecon countries, in this case driven by 
low costs and market opportunities. While 
being responsive to such features in their 
environment, many of the same MNEs are 
effectively integrating their operations 
across the region in order to maximise 
their competitiveness. Set against this 
diversity and frequent unpredictability, it is 
difficult to see how the Scottish devolution 
proposals as they stand can be regarded as 
a major threat to the corporations 
concerned. Of course, it is possible to 
contend that some of the country 
environments described above are 
recognised by MNEs as being less 
favourable to inward investors than the UK 
and that the volume which they attract 
reflects this. There is some truth in this 
argument in that no other EU country has 
pursued such consistent policies of inward 
investment attraction and development 
over the past 30-40 years. Scotland has 
had a central place in that strategy and it is 
highly desirable that this remains the case. 
Equally, there is no reason to believe that 
Investment decision-making processes: 
As would readily be attested by inward 
investment agencies throughout Europe, 
the majority of projects handled by them 
which lead to greenfield investment 
decisions are under consideration for 
between two and four years. There is 
ample evidence (Hood and Truijens, 1993) 
to show that this is a complex and multi-
stage process which evaluates and re-
evaluates a wide range of corporate, 
sectoral, technological and environmental 
variables before finally choosing a country, 
a region within it and a location. 
Although these processes are well-
documented on the macro level, many of 
the nuances at the micro level, which lead 
to the inclusion and exclusion of locations, 
are difficult to identify. For this reason, 
die gap between the realities of devolution 
as proposed and perceptions regarding 
these proposals is a potentially serious 
issue for Scotland. The very heat and 
vigour of the political debate regarding the 
subject over the past two years will 
probably be factored into the decision-
making processes of some companies who 
will make European investment decisions 
over the next two to tiiree years. Whether 
these will be rationally and systematically 
evaluated, and perhaps discounted, as a 
substantive factor to their investment or 
reinvestment decisions; or regarded as 
reflecting an emerging environmental 
change which could be material in the 
medium to long term, only time will tell. 
The thrust of the argument in this paper, 
however, inclines to the former view in 
most cases. The latter perspective is more 
likely to prevail in companies with litde or 
no international production experience for 
whom a European investment project is a 
major departure from their normal decision 
processes. 
Locadonal advantages and uncertainty: 
As has been observed, inward investment 
in the EU has tended to gravitate to 
preferred environments, of which the UK 
is one. There are a whole series of well-
established reasons as to why this is so, 
almost all of which are not called into 
question by devolution in Scotland. For 
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example, while the unitary UK 
position on inward investment 
policy and promotion is of some 
advantage to potential investors, 
the detailed pursuit of companies 
and the handling of investment 
cases is mainly undertaken at the 
regional level. In effect, the UK 
has addressed these issues by 
h a v i n g a m e a s u r e of 
differentiation within an agreed 
framework, whereby the 
development, presentation and 
integration of locational 
advantages is handled at the 
regional level and close to the 
customer. It is difficult then to 
argue that the 'unity and diversity' 
approach would be seriously 
impaired by a body such as 
Locate in Scotland (LIS) 
reporting to a parliament which is 
still operating within an agreed 
UK and EU framework. In 
effect, and viewed from a 
corporate viewpoint, such a 
change does not seem to heighten 
the 'uncertainty index' for an 
inward investor. Of course, were 
devolution to result in both 
Scottish independence and greater 
degrees of regional fragmentation 
in fiscal affairs throughout the 
UK, this conclusion would have 
to be revisited. 
Relevant Competitive Trends for FDI Attraction 
in Europe 
It has been particularly evident in the past decade 
that many European countries have begun to take 
steps to gain a greater share of the market for 
'attractable' inward investment flowing into the 
region. There are many factors motivating this, 
including the high market share enjoyed by the UK 
and a few other countries; the desire to gain the 
spillover benefits from fdi (including those flowing 
from intra-EU investment); and the intention to 
deploy inward investment attraction and 
development as regional and industrial policy 
instruments. As a result of the adoption of a 
different or, in some cases, merely a more 
consistent policy towards fdi, there are now many 
more active agencies operating in this business in 
Europe, most of whom compete directly with 
Scotland. Not all of these are as well resourced 
and few have as comprehensive international 
networks as LIS/SE. Many are sub-regional or 
local, and some specialise in particular sectors 
which do not always pose a threat to Scotland. 
However, taken together, there are probably at least 
twice as many inward investment agencies in 
Europe which compete directly with LIS than there 
were a decade ago. Outwith Central and Eastern 
Europe, this period has witnessed most of the 
Scandinavian countries entering me market, as well 
as revitalised efforts in France and Germany, to say 
nothing of the more effective efforts of other UK 
regions. Many of these new entrants have, within 
the constraints of their resources, attempted to 
emulate the one-door approach to inward 
investment targeting developed in the 1970s and 
early 1980s in Ireland and Scotland. 
It is against this background that devolution is 
planned to take place. It is therefore essential to 
consider which aspects of that late 1990s 
environment might be relevant to the maintenance 
of Scottish inward investment competitive position 
post-devolution. 
MNEs operating in Europe have, as a 
matter of routine, to be able to both locate 
and develop their affiliates in an ever-
widening range of political environments. 
Provided the fundamental factors of 
markets and costs remain within acceptable 
ranges, there is no prima facie reason to 
believe that these affiliates will not be able 
to adjust to the proposed changes in 
Scotland which are at the relatively 
moderate end of the spectrum of 
environmental change. 
• In view of the strength of the Scottish 
inward investment performance, with 
between 20-25% of the reported UK cases 
over recent years according to the Invest in 
Britain Bureau (IBB) statistics, it is highly 
probable that some competitors will 
endeavour to highlight the uncertainties 
associated with devolution. This is likely 
to occur both within the UK and in other 
parts of Europe, and could prove 
damaging. There are several ways in 
which this could be countered. All of 
them require close dialogue between policy 
makers and international companies, 
together with the clearest possible 
communication about the detailed nature of 
the proposals for Scotland. It is well-
known that such changes are among those 
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where the knowledge base of 
overseas-based business is 
particularly imperfect, and the 
subtleties of the debate readily 
misunderstood or misrepresented. 
This is an area where early and 
clear 'supportive signals' are 
required from the policy makers. 
• One of the critical factors in Scotland's 
success with inward investment lies in the 
'endorsement effect' flowing from 
successive management teams choosing to 
both invest and reinvest in the country as 
a consequence of good comparative 
performance in their plants. While the 
majority of that effect is generated by 
corporate performance within subsidiaries, 
it does have a public sector dimension in 
the maintenance of a consistently 
supportive environment. In view of the 
heightened competition outlined, this 
would not be an appropriate time to 
introduce major uncertainty into this 
process. Once more, such a conclusion 
places a premium on minimum change and 
maximum transparency. 
• A final point worth stressing in this section 
is the observation that a considerable 
volume of the direct, project by project 
competition which takes place for inward 
investment in Europe occurs between 
rather different environments. The 
competition between Scotland and Ireland 
for many electronics projects provide a 
consistent illustration of this over the past 
two decades and more. While there are 
similarities, there are also substantial 
differences between the two environments. 
Yet it is clear that when viewed over the 
long term and when the various factors are 
weighed up by MNEs, both provide 
equally attractive locations. As proposed, 
the devolution measures in Scotland seem 
capable of being factored in to such 
calculations without serious detriment to 
the Scottish case. 
The Relative Importance of the Devolution Issue 
Before drawing conclusions, some observations are 
necessary on the relative importance of devolution 
within the spectrum of policy areas relating to the 
future of inward investment in Scotland. While 
devolution might appear to be a major 
contemporary issue, there are a number of others 
which may well be considerably more important in 
both the short and medium term. A number of 
these were previously examined in another context 
(Hood, 1991), but the critical areas are considered 
in this section. They can be readily divided 
between external and internal environmental 
changes and are now briefly reviewed. 
• External environment: There are many 
factors in this category which could act to 
challenge the relative position of Scotland 
as an inward investment location. They 
include the following: -
(a) Changing investment modalities: 
Although data are sparse, the 
weight of evidence points to 
greenfield projects being a 
relatively small and diminishing 
proportion of total manufacturing 
related inward investment. 
Mergers, joint ventures, alliances 
and other forms of collaborative 
agreements account for a growing 
proportion of both investment 
flows and stocks. In effect, the 
pool in which LIS and others are 
fishing is relatively smaller. 
Meanwhile, the strength, scale 
and range of die indigenous 
industrial base is a greater 
determinant of whether business 
collaboration of other types will 
occur and in any event such 
relationships are more determined 
by business synergies than by 
geography. 
(b) European enlargement: While 
the 1992 EU integration effect 
has been positive for inward 
investment into Scotland, 
European enlargement is unlikely 
to be an unqualified benefit. 
Given the range of manufacturing 
options which the majority of US 
companies located in Scotland 
have within the EU, there is the 
prospect of differential investment 
patterns skewed towards the 
emerging markets in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Moreover, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Hungary, are now serious 
competitors for certain types of 
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greenfield projects 
their own right. 
in 
(c) Differentiation of the Scottish 
product: This is a many-sided 
issue, wherein it remains 
necessary to offset peripherality 
and the perception of Scotland as 
a location to serve European 
markets. LIS competes with both 
national and regional development 
organisations on a world market 
basis, but it has become more 
difficult to differentiate UK 
regions from a marketing point of 
view. One reason for this is that 
the standard methodology of 
investment attraction has become 
ever more professional, 
integrated, analytical and based 
on selective company targeting. 
In the Scottish case, over the 
recent past, much of the 
differentiation has come from the 
educational infrastructure, the 
supplier base, the performance 
record of existing overseas 
companies, the work of LIS in 
customer care, and so on. These 
are likely to remain critical 
factors, as are continued 
upgrading of logis t ics , 
communications infrastructure, 
and the maintenance of some 
level of regional financial 
assistance. There is some 
considerable risk attached to the 
latter at the EU level as more 
deserving national cases emerge; 
although more transparency 
regarding aid throughout the EU 
may help to counter this to some 
degree. 
(d) Single European Currency: In 
the period since 1992 the 
combination of productivity 
improvements and shorter term 
exchange rate effects have 
combined to further enhance the 
UK case for fdi, even in a period 
of recession in most major EU 
markets. This favourable macro 
economic environment serves to 
highlight the potential effects on 
fdi of a move towards a single 
European currency, with the 
prospect of the UK being outwith 
such a structure. While not 
always speaking with one voice, 
the general weight of international 
business opinion would appear to 
regard this as undesirable, given 
the strategic role which many UK 
based plants play in European 
markets. The scale of uncertainty 
surrounding the UK's position on 
this issue far outweighs that 
associated with devolution. 
Internal environment: There are perhaps 
two main areas of internal change which 
are of more fundamental importance to 
Scotland's inward investment effort than is 
devolution at this stage. These two areas 
concern organisational structures and 
functions for inward investment; and the 
nature of regional policy. 
(a) Structures and functions: This 
aspect of the internal Scottish 
environment has been highly 
supportive of the work of LIS, 
effectively co-ordinating public 
and private sector roles and 
focusing these upon customer 
care at all levels. This approach 
has paid good dividends for 
Scotland. Moreover, it has come 
through the transition of the past 
five years reasonably intact over 
a period which witnessed the 
emergence of Scottish Enterprise 
and Local Enterprise Companies 
and the beginnings of the 
rundown of the New Town 
Development Corporations. Both 
of these events are still capable of 
introducing fragmentation to an 
integrated effort. In addition, 
there are other core competitive 
issues associated with the role of 
the public sector in the provision 
of industrial land and property 
and the relative unwillingness of 
the private sector to fill the 
speculative build gap which is 
being left by the dissolution of 
the New Towns. Irrespective of 
the dogma which abounds in this 
area, the reality is that LIS 
competes vigorously with similar 
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bodies throughout 
Europe who aim to 
provide property and 
land as part of then-
incentive package. By 
w h a t e v e r m e a n s 
therefore a further 
measure of flexibility 
will have to be 
developed to address this 
area. 
(b) Regional policy: The future 
relationship between inward 
investment and regional policy is 
a crucial one for Scotland 
(Young, et al, 1994). While not 
all inward investment in the UK 
is subject to the effects of 
regional policy, there is ample 
evidence that measures such as 
Regional Selective Assistance 
(RSA) play an important role in 
the distribution of such 
investment to the Assisted Areas 
(AAs). For example, in 1993/94, 
43% of the inward investment 
success recorded by IBB 
throughout the UK had RSA (or 
equivalent) support. All of the 
external environmental challenges 
mentioned above call for the 
continuation of active regional 
policy measures in the UK for 
both the attraction and 
development of inward 
investment, while recognising the 
fundamental role of supply side 
factors in determining the 
attractiveness of the UK and its 
regions as business locations. 
However, as has been pointed out 
in another context (Hood and 
Young, 1995), the case for 
attempting to maximise the 
economic benefit from inward 
investment is a strong one and, if 
espoused, would lead to a 
different approach being taken to 
some regional policy instruments. 
For example, were the whole 
issue of subsidiary development 
within international companies to 
become a serious focus for policy 
initiatives, it would become 
evident that the enhancement of 
the innovative and technological 
base of Scotland was not always 
readily addressed by RSA, on 
grounds of modest capital 
expenditure and few jobs created 
in many R&D projects. 
Experience in discussing these 
matters with MNEs and 
development agencies shows that 
there is ample evidence of 
development (and some research) 
projects migrating to more 
incentivised and/or more tax 
effective locations. In this 
regard, these projects have shown 
themselves to be internationally 
mobile. As presently operated, 
there is every expectation that 
many major development projects 
which could 'naturally' emerge 
alongside strategic manufacturing 
facilities in Scotland have not 
done so, and probably will not do 
so, because of the way in which 
the regional policy regime is 
operated. On a medium term 
basis, this is likely to have a 
much more serious effect on 
inward investment potential than 
has devolution. 
Conclusions 
In arriving at this relatively benign view of the 
potential effects of devolution on inward 
investment, much depends on the consequent 
behaviour of politicians in a Scottish Parliament in 
terms of their attitudes to business and economic 
development Appendix 1 makes it clear that there 
are rather negative expectations in this area from 
some business quarters. It is acknowledged that 
there are many imponderables in this equation 
which go beyond the impact of the proposed 
measures. However, in the light of the foregoing 
commentary and recognising that informed 
judgement has to be applied in many of the areas 
considered, the following conclusions can be 
drawn:-
• There is no prima facie case for claiming 
that devolution as currently proposed will 
have a negative effect on Scotland's 
position for either inward investment 
attraction or development. 
• However, the consideration of devolution 
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itself affords ample opportunity 
for the perpetuation of uncertainty 
regarding the proposals, both on 
the part of competitors in the 
inward investment business and 
by politicians engaging in 
speculation as to whether the 
implementation of devolution will 
lead to the ultimate pursuit of 
separatism. 
Such uncertainties can best be addressed 
by the development of a working 
relationship between the prospective policy 
makers and the business community, 
whether indigenous or international in their 
origins. Although such dialogue has been 
a feature of the Scottish environment, its 
significance takes on a new meaning in the 
devolution context where a different range 
of policy issues might be determined 
within Scotland. If such a change of 
environment is the policy of the 
government of the day, it is in the interests 
of all parties that it is shaped by informed 
opinion. 
There are relatively few inherent 
characteristics of the foreign-owned sector 
in Scodand where devolution is likely to 
have distinctive effects. Among these are 
smaller less experienced MNEs, and some 
parts of the electronics sector. In general 
the cost, market and efficiency factors 
associated with high performance in 
Scottish locations is likely to offset any 
potentially negative effects. 
Viewed from the wider European 
perspective, and bearing in mind the 
diversity of environments from within 
which MNEs assess European markets, 
devolution in Scodand has to be regarded 
as a relatively minor change. Such 
companies display capabilities of 
effectively integrating their operations at 
the same time as being responsive to local 
conditions. However, the time span over 
which location and investment 
development decisions are taken, together 
with the imperfections of information 
which abound, creates the real possibility 
of a gap between the realities of these 
proposals and perceptions about them. 
The European competition for inward 
investment has grown substantially over 
the past decade. This has only served to 
make the range of operating environments 
accommodated by these companies ever 
wider, provided the market and cost 
conditions remain favourable. Few of 
these environments have been as stable 
and as welcoming to inward investment as 
Scodand/UK has been in the past four 
decades. While devolution will act to 
change this environment, some of the 
others are changing in more radical 
directions. However, every effort has to 
be made to have minimum change and 
maximum transparency in the Scottish 
context, so that a minor issue is not 
allowed to become a major one by default. 
Finally, many of the issues considered in 
mis paper will require to be tested witiiin 
the business environment and the elicited 
responses carefully reviewed. Such an 
exercise is particularly difficult where 
several different scenarios could be 
developed, ranging from the benign to the 
malevolent. It is, for example, evident that 
opinion differs widely on whether 
devolution can be contained to the 
proposals as specified; equally the 
potential impact on individual MNEs will 
vary, as will the perspective of the senior 
managers concerned. 
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APPENDIX 1 
When this paper was published in its original form, 
it largely contained the analysis, perspectives and 
interpretation reflected in the previous pages. At 
that time it was circulated to some twenty senior 
individuals who are prominent in Scottish business 
and public life, in order to seek their reactions. 
This section reflects a number of the comments 
which emerged from that exercise, without 
attributing them to their source. Together they 
provide an insight into aspects of the uncertainty 
and lack of trust in some quarters when it comes to 
assessing the devolution proposals. Before 
commenting on them, it should be stressed that the 
paper is concerned with inward investment and 
devolution as specified. Most business 
commentators found it either impossible, or 
artificial, to stay within these conceptual constraints. 
Their comments were mainly concerned with the 
potential impact on major indigenous businesses 
and were founded on the expectation that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for any government 
to stay within the remit of devolutionary powers as 
presently specified. 
The comments included the following lines of 
argument: 
1 From those concerned within the public 
sector with inward investment there was 
broad agreement that devolution as 
specified did not appear to feature in the 
on-going process of evaluating Scotland as 
an investment location and that the macro 
risk and opportunity factors associated 
with UK locations were more dominant 
issues. 
2 One clear message to emerge from the 
business perspective was that, while the 
making of complex business decisions 
does not involve the assessment of many 
risks, these are part of a normal process. 
On the other hand, the imposition of 
political risk and uncertainty above the 
norm, such as in the context of devolution, 
takes business into territory with which 
they are naturally less comfortable. This 
in itself was seen to call for dialogue and 
persuasive argument to reduce these 
uncertainties. 
3 Another important concern which was 
voiced related to the importance of UK 
cost competitiveness both for indigenous 
and international businesses. The view 
was expressed that even if devolution did 
not lead towards independence, it could, if 
further spending powers were to be vested 
in a Scottish parliament, progressively lead 
to higher spending, thus affecting business 
costs and returns. The underlying 
assumption in this set of comments was 
that more localised government for 
Scotland would find it difficult to preserve 
the environment within which UK 
competitiveness has improved over the 
past decade. 
4 The paper elicited a number of rather 
different evaluations about the political 
complexion of a devolved parliament. 
These included the belief that, irrespective 
of the policy platform on which devolution 
was introduced, there would be a 
substantial number of radical members 
whose past rhetoric was critical of MNEs 
and that could ultimately change the 
inward investment climate in Scotland. 
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Others argued that, under certain 
political scenarios, and the 
existence of proportional 
representation, a hung parliament 
was more likely and therefore 
that the political climate would 
continue to be broadly supportive 
towards inward investment Both 
of these perspectives tended to 
regard the view taken in the 
paper as too benign, while 
claiming that there was still a 
lack of clarity about what was 
really being proposed. 
5 Another recurring theme was that of the 
inexperience of the policy makers in 
matters relating to the maintenance of a 
competitive environment in Scotland and 
the implicit commitment to spending 
programmes which would require more tax 
raising powers. In its more extreme form, 
comment on this general theme focused on 
the potential narrow-mindedness of some 
of the likely factions in a Scottish 
parliament which would not be supportive 
of business interests in general and which 
might over-react to restructuring within 
MNEs in particular. 
6 Most of the business comment noted above 
came from indigenous business leaders. In 
contrast the general perspective of the 
senior managers of MNEs who offered 
their views has been broadly supportive of 
the arguments presented here. Provided 
responsible attitudes were maintained in 
the design and implementation of 
devolution, such a change was not 
regarded as exerting a major influence on 
their activities in Scotland. This type of 
assessment has of course to be seen 
against a setting in which both the public 
and private sectors have been strongly 
supportive of inward investment and the 
central presumption that it was in the 
interests of all political parties for this to 
be maintained. It has also to be 
recognised that these companies do not 
have Scottish headquarters and that factor 
in itself would appear to underlie some of 
the concerns from indigenous business 
leaders. 
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